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The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has received much attention since its introduction by Shenker
(1990) and its extensive analysis by Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994). It was originally
conceived for problems where n agents request diﬀerent quantities of a private good, the sum
of which is produced by a single facility. This rule can be constructed from two ethical axioms:
Equal Treatment of Equals (in terms of demands) and Independence of Larger Demands (a
protection of small demanders against larger ones). It satisﬁes other interesting properties
and has other characterizations as well. It is therefore natural to investigate whether this
rule can be extended to more general problems while keeping similar properties.
Sprumont (1998) brings a partial answer to this question by proposing the Axial Serial
Rule for the case where each agent requests a single speciﬁc good. Koster et al. (1998)
propose a similar extension, the Radial Serial Rule, for the context where agents request
several but homogeneous private goods. Both rules use stand alone costs as a basis to
compare demands. As its name implies, the Radial Serial Rule uses intermediate demands
that are constructed by changing the original demands in a proportional way.
None of the two problems considered by these authors is more general than the other. Our
paper considers a more general context where each agent requests a list of goods that may be
private, public, or speciﬁc to some agents and where aggregate demand is not necessarily the
sum of individual demands. By allowing agents to have vectors of personalized demands, we
generalize both the models of Sprumont (1998) and of Koster et al. (1998). Moreover, we ad-
mit more general paths along which demands may be scaled down to construct intermediate
demands. This yields a rule that we call the Path Serial Rule.
The paper presents an analysis of this rule in the light of properties found in the literature
on cost sharing rules. These properties are transposed or extended to the general context
whenever possible. Otherwise, they are weakened by requiring that the predicate holds
only for changes in the demands taking place along the speciﬁed paths. This is the case
of the Serial Principle deﬁned by Sprumont (1998) since it is shown that this principle is
incompatible with the basic Equal Treatment of Equals. The weaker Path Serial Principle
characterizes the Path Serial Rule together with the Equal Treatment of Equivalent Demands
in terms of stand alone costs, a stronger form of Equal Treatment of Equals. The Path Serial
Rule also satisﬁes properties similar in spirit to the ones that hold for the original Serial
Rule. However, we show that a characterization in terms of other properties, as in Moulin
and Shenker (1994), Sprumont (1998), and Koster et al. (1998) depends crucially on the
fact that the Axial, the Radial and the Path Serial Rule use stand alone costs to compare
demands.
1The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some of the known results
on serial cost sharing and its generalization, in particular those of Kolpin (1996), Sprumont
(1998) and Koster et al. (1998). We also give an overview of the paper. The formulation
of the problem and the main deﬁnitions are given in Section 3. The section ends with an
example illustrating the importance of the more general form of the problems to be consid-
ered. The Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule is deﬁned in Section 4. Three sets of properties
that can be imposed on a cost sharing rule are presented and discussed in Section 5. The
incompatibility result and the characterization of the Path Serial Rule in the general context
are the object of Section 6. A brief conclusion follows as Section 7. Two more technical
proofs appear in the last section.
2O v e r v i e w o f t h e p a p e r
With the original Serial Cost Sharing Rule, agents are ordered according to their demands.
Then, the cost of producing n times the demand of agent 1, which is called an intermediate
demand, is shared equally among all agents. In addition, agents 2 to n must bear equally the
incremental cost of another intermediate demand in which the demand of agents 2 to n is
increased to the level of the demand of agent 2. Next, the incremental cost of an intermediate
demand, in which the demand of agents 3 to n is increased to the level of the demand of
agent 3, is shared equally among agents 3 to n and so on until total demand is satisﬁed.
The two rules of Sprumont (1998) and Koster et al. (1998) consist in ﬁrst ordering
individual demands according to their stand alone costs. Next, a ﬁrst intermediate demand
is constructed by reducing demands of agents 2 to n along a ray or an axis down to the point
where their stand alone costs is the same as for agent 1. A second intermediate demand is
constructed by reducing demands of agents 3 to n down to the point where their stand alone
costs is the same as for agent 2, etc. Finally, the serial formula is applied to the costs of
these intermediate demands. The rules bear the names Axial or Radial because of the way
in which individual demands are reduced to construct intermediate demands.
Rays are particular cases of increasing paths. In some circumstances, it may be natural to
adjust all components of the demand of an agent along the ray to which it belongs. In others,
this may not be appropriate. For technological considerations or simply as an expression of
preferences, they may have to be adjusted in a non linear way. As pointed out by Koster et
al. (1998), one can envisage other extensions of the Serial Rule using more general paths to
scale the demands. This idea leads to the deﬁnition of the Path Serial Rule, which may be
seen as an application of the original Serial Rule to a path reduction of the problem.
2The original Serial Cost Sharing Rule has a simple characterization: it is the only cost
sharing rule to satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE) and Independence of Larger De-
mands (ILD). Condition (ETE) requires that equal demands be treated identically while
(ILD) requires that the cost share of an agent be independent of the size of the demands
that are larger than his or hers. In more general contexts, these conditions do not have
much bite since demands are not directly comparable. Sprumont (1998) proposes stronger
forms of these conditions, which he calls respectively Symmetry (S) and the Serial Principle
(SP). The idea behind Symmetry is that if the demands of two agents can be interchanged
without altering total cost, then the two goods should be deemed comparable. Then, if the
two agents request the same quantity of these two goods, they should be charged the same
amount. A stronger property introduced by Koster et al. (1998) is Equal Treatment of
Equivalent Demands (ETV), where demands are equivalent when they have the same stand
alone cost.
(ILD) implies the ordering of agents according to their demands, which may be impossible
in more general contexts. Sprumont’s answer is to order agents according to the cost shares
produced by the rule. Then, the Serial Principle says that an agent who pays less than
another agent should not see her cost share change if this other agent increases his demand.
Koster et al. (1998) deﬁne a weaker form of this property called the Radial Serial Principle
(RSP), which says that an agent who pays less than another agent should not see her cost
share change if this other agent increases his demand along the ray to which it belongs. In
the more general context considered here, this property becomes the Path Serial Principle
(PSP). Thus, the Axial, the Radial, and the Path Serial Rules are characterized by (ETV)
together with (SP), (RSP), and (PSP) respectively.
Moulin and Shenker (1994) show that the original Serial Cost Sharing Rule enjoys other
remarkable ethical and coherency properties. Among other results, it is characterized by
the combination of Additivity, Separability (for separable cost functions), Free Lunch, and
Fair Ranking. Additivity requires that a rule yields the same results, whether it is applied
separately to diﬀerent cost elements or to their sums. Separability says that if cost is a linear
function of total demand, then it should be allocated proportionally to the demands. Free
Lunch says that if the cost of an n-fold replication of an agent’s demand is zero, so should
be the cost share of this agent. Fair Ranking, also called No-Domination, says that the cost
shares of agents should be ordered as their demands. It implies (ETE). While Separability,
Free Lunch, and Fair Ranking can be transposed to the Path Serial Rule, this is not the
case of Additivity. Indeed, Kolpin (1996) shows that there is no extension of the Serial Rule
3to a multidimensional context satisfying Scale Invariance and Additivity. Thus, none of the
Axial, Radial, and Path Serial Rules satisﬁes Additivity.
T h eo r i g i n a lS e r i a lR u l ei si m m u n et oa r b i t r a r yc h a n g e si nt h ew a yo u t p u ti sm e a s u r e d .
It satisﬁes a property introduced by Sprumont (1998) and called Ordinality, which says that
arbitrary changes in the units in which output is measured should not aﬀe c tc o s ts h a r e s .
A weaker property is Scale Invariance, which prescribes the invariance of cost shares with
respect to linear changes in the units. We extend Ordinality to the general context considered
in this paper by requiring that the paths that belong to the speciﬁcation of a problem be
transformed with the demands and the cost function to give an equivalent problem. We also
impose that demands that enter symmetrically in the cost function be transformed with the
same function in order to preserve symmetry. The Path Serial Rule satisﬁes Ordinality thus
deﬁned.
Coming back to other characterizations, Sprumont (1998) shows that the Axial Serial
Rule is the only cost sharing rule that satisﬁes Symmetry (S), Rank Independence of Irrel-
evant Agents (RIIA), Independence of Null Agents (INA), Ordinality (O), and the Serial
Principle (SP). Condition (RIIA) imposes that the ranking of two agents’ cost shares de-
pends on their demands only. Put diﬀerently, a change in an agent’s demand must not aﬀect
the interpersonal ranking of others’ cost shares. (INA) states that agents with null demands
can be entirely removed from a problem without altering the outcome for the others. This
implies that agents with null demands pay zero.
Koster et al. (1998) assert that Sprumont’s characterization of the Axial Serial Rule does
not extend to the Radial Serial Rule in their homogeneous context. We reinforce their result
by showing that (SP) and (ETE) are incompatible in this context. Since (ETE) is hardly a
disputable requirement, (SP) must be weakened in some way. Therefore, Koster et al. deﬁne
the Radial Serial Principle (RSP), by restricting (SP) to rays. We deﬁne the Path Serial
Principle (PSP) in a similar way, by restricting (SP) to paths.
Koster et al. also have a characterization theorem, asserting that the Radial Serial Rule is
the only cost sharing rule that satisﬁes (RSP), (INA), (RIIA), (ETE), and Radial Ordinality
(RO), a weaker form or ordinality. We argue that there is an implicit assumption behind
the theorems of Sprumont and of Koster et al.: stand alone cost is the proper basis for
the comparison of heterogeneous demands. We show that, by choosing other basis, we get
other rules that also satisfy all the conditions of their theorems. In the general context of
this paper, these other rules and the Path serial rule satisfy (S), (RIIA), (INA), and (O) in
addition to (PSP).
43 The Cost Sharing Problem
A cost sharing problem starts with a proﬁle of demands, to which a cost function is applied.
In some cases, as with serial cost sharing, demands may have to be scaled down to meet
certain conditions. The cost sharing problem must thus be completed by a description of
how this should be made. We address each of these elements in the next three subsections.
Then, we examine special cases of this problem found in the literature and we present an
example to illustrate the generality of our approach.
3.1 The demands
Throughout this paper, there is a ﬁxed set of divisible commodities K = {1,...,k} and a
ﬁxed set of agents N = {1,...,n}. T h ec o m m o d i t i e sm a yb eg o o d s ,c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ss e r v i n g
to describe needs, or speciﬁcations of a certain facility. A commodity may be speciﬁct oa
particular agent or a subset of agents. This means that these agents are the only ones to be
able to consume, use, or enjoy the commodity in question. Hence, they will be the only ones
to demand positive quantities of this commodity. As for non speciﬁc commodities, they may
be private or public or anything in between.
For each agent i ∈ N, let there be a positive integer mi ≤ k and a one-to-one function
 i : {1,...,m i} → K, specifying the list of commodities that may be requested by this
agent. Next, let Mi be the range of  i, i.e. Mi = { i(1),...,  i(mi)}. In plain words, Mi is
the subset of commodities for which agent i may request a positive quantity. We assume
that K = ∪n
i=1Mi. Thus, for each commodity, there is at least one agent concerned by this
commodity.
The demand of agent i is described by a vector qi ∈ R
mi
+ . The scalar qih is the demand of
commodity  i(h) ∈ Mi by agent i. Let M = {M1,...,M n} with cardinality m =
Pn
i=1 mi ≤





+ . Given a subset S ⊂ N
and Q ∈ Rm
+, let QS ∈ Rm
+ be the vector obtained from Q by changing all components
qj,j∈ N\S, for components of 0.
3.2 The cost function
To continue the description of the problem, we assume that the agents jointly own a facility
to jointly produce any list of commodities that are requested. The cost of producing a bundle
Y ∈ Rm
+ is C (Y ). A cost function C : Rm
+ → R+ also induces n stand alone cost functions
ci : R
mi









+ , let yi ¿ y0
i mean yih <y 0
ih,h=1 ,...,m i. We shall say that ci : R
mi
+ → R+
is increasing if yi ¿ y0
i implies ci (yi) <c i (y0
i). Thus, ci is increasing if an increase in all
components of yi yields a cost increase.
Let C(m) be the class of continuous and non-decreasing functions C : Rm
+ → R+ satis-
fying C (0) = 0 and whose induced functions ci,i=1 ,...,n,are increasing. We shall work
with this class of functions throughout the paper. Whereas we need the mild assumption
that each ci be increasing, we do not want to impose and we do not need that C be in-
creasing. In other words, Y ≤ Y 0 ∈ Rm
+ and yi ¿ y0
i for some i do not necessarily imply
C (Y ) <C(Y 0). Indeed, C may be the result of a more or less complex aggregation and
optimization procedure. Thus, it is not necessarily increasing in all its components as, for
example, when some public goods are involved.
A function C ∈ C(m) is symmetric in the components i and j if C (Y )=C (Yij) ∀Y ∈
Rm
+ where Yij is the vector Y with the components i and j interchanged. This requires that
mi = mj but not necessarily Mi = Mj. A function C ∈ C(nk) is symmetric if it is symmetric
in the components i and j ∀i,j ∈ N. F o ras y m m e t r i cf u n c t i o n ,w el e tmi = k ∀i. Thus,
m = nk.
Note that if C ∈ C(m) is symmetric in the components i and j, then ci (x)=cj (x) ∀x ∈
R
mi






= cj (x) for any Y ∈ Rm
+ such that yi = yj = x.
The middle equality follows from the fact that the diﬀerence between Y {i} and Y {j} amounts
to an interchange of the components i and j.
3.3 The paths
Serial cost sharing requires that larger demands be initially scaled down to a level equivalent
to smaller ones. In some circumstances, it may be natural to adjust all components of the
demand of an agent along the ray to which it belongs, i.e. proportionally. This is the method
used in the Radial Serial Rule. In other circumstances, this may not be appropriate. As
pointed out by Koster et al. (1998) in their Remark 3.7, one can envisage other extensions
of the serial rule using more general paths to scale the demands. This is the idea developed
in this paper. This approach requires that we add the rules according to which demands
must be scaled, to Q and C in the deﬁnition of a cost sharing problem.




+ , which map each y ∈ R
mi
+ and
τ ∈ R+ onto a vector hi (y,τ) ∈ R
mi
+ . Assume that hi (y, ·) is non-decreasing, increasing
without bound in at least one component, and that for each y ∈ R
mi
+ , there exists a τ0 ∈ R+
(necessarily unique) such that hi (y,τ0)=y. Let Hi be the class of these functions. Then,





+ since hi is deﬁned for each y ∈ R
mi
+ . Finally, let hR
i : R
mi




i (y,τ)=τy.This function deﬁnes the ray through a y 6=0in R
mi
+ . Index i may
be dropped in the homogeneous case.
We do not impose that hi (y,0) = 0 and that hi (y, ·) be continuous and increasing
in all components. However, given a function C ∈ C(m), we restrict ourselves to the
class of functions Hi (ci) ⊂ Hi for which ci (hi (y, ·)) is continuous and increasing, with
ci (hi (y,0)) = 0. Since ci (0) = 0 and since ci is increasing, this implies that there is at least
one null component in hi (y,0). In words, a path starts on an axis but not necessarily at
the origin. The cost of the bundle at the starting point is null and increasing thereafter.
This deﬁnition of Hi (ci) insures that for any α ∈ R+, t h e r ei sau n i q u eτα such that
ci (hi (y,τα)) = α.
Let H(C)=H1 (c1)×···×H n (cn),H(Y,τ)=( h1 (y1,τ1),...,h n (yn,τn)),a n dC(m)×
H = {(C,H):C ∈ C(m) and H ∈ H(C)}. A cost sharing problem is a triple (Q,C,H) ∈
Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C). Accordingly, a cost sharing rule is a mapping ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→
Rn




The vector ξ (Q,C,H) i st h el i s to fc o s ts h a r e sf o rt h ep r o b l e m(Q,C,H).
We assume that H is exogenous as is the case of Q. T h ec h o i c eo fhi may come from
agent i, be imposed by the planner or be negotiated between all those concerned. The
criteria leading to the adoption of a particular hi may include technological considerations
or preferences. For example, the diﬀerent components of qi may pertain to diﬀerent technical
characteristics of a facility and for technological reasons that only agent i knows, any change
in qi should be done according to a function hi (not necessarily linear) supplied by the agent.
Alternatively, hi may be the expression of a preference by the agent. In the example given
below, each agent has a two-component demand, gas in summer and gas in winter. If these
demands are to be reduced, some agents may prefer a reduction of gas available in summer
rather than a proportional reduction of both. Others may have diﬀerent desiderata.
3.4 Special cases
With some abuse of notation, we write Mi = {i} ∀i to describe the case where each agent
requests a quantity of a single speciﬁc or personalized good as in Sprumont (1998). This
implies M = K = N. In this case, a problem may be written as a pair (Q,C) ∈ Rn
+×C(n).
At the other end of the spectrum, when Mi = K ∀i and C (Y )=c(
P
i yi) with c : Rk
+ →
R+, all commodities are homogeneous and private. Following Moulin and Shenker (1994)
7and Sprumont (1998), we call these functions and the resulting problems homogeneous. If
in addition, hi = hR ∀i as with the Radial Serial Rule, then a problem may be written as a
pair (Q,C) ∈ Rnk
+ × C(nk).
Moulin-Shenker k =1 Mi = K ∀i C (Y )=c(
P
i yi)
Koster et al. (1998) Mi = K ∀i C (Y )=c(
P
i yi)
Sprumont (1998) k = n Mi = {i} ∀i
Table 1: Special cases
T a b l e1s u m m a r i z e st h ed i ﬀerent features of problems considered in the literature thus
far. One can see that none of the two problems considered by Sprumont (1998) and Koster et
al. (1998) is more general than the other. Koster et al. study homogeneous problems while
Sprumont suppose only one commodity for each agent. By comparison, we allow mi > 1
and Mi 6= Mj ∀i,j. This means that agents may have vectors of demands for goods that are
speciﬁc to them. Thus, we generalize both the model of Sprumont and the one of Koster et
al. Actually, we allow for any mix of private, public, and speciﬁc commodities. In addition,
the hi deﬁne paths that are not necessarily rays.
3.5 An example
We conclude this section with an example that illustrates the kind of problem that can ﬁt
in this general framework. Suppose there are three cities A,B and C that must be supplied
with natural gas from point S. Thus, a pipeline must be built to link the three cities to the
supply S. The possible links are represented in Figure 1. Thus, B could be fed directly from






Figure 1: A Network of pipelines
8L e tt h e r eb et w op e r i o d s ,s u m m e ra n dw i n t e r . E a c hc i t yh a sad e m a n di ne a c hp e r i o d
and this demand is expected to remain the same forever. Thus, the proﬁle of demands is a
sextuple:
Q =( ( qas,q aw),(qbs,q bw),(qcs,q cw))
Not only is gas in winter diﬀerent from gas in summer but gas available in one city is diﬀerent
from gas available in a diﬀerent city. Gas is a speciﬁc good. Indeed, supplying additional
gas to A has an impact on costs that is diﬀerent from the impact on costs of supplying the
same quantity to B or C.
A network of pipelines may be represented by a γ ∈ R4
+ specifying the capacity of each
of the four segments labelled 1,2,3,4. If we assume that the marginal cost of a segment
is decreasing with its capacity and if cost is to be minimized, only one of segments 1 and
4 will be built. In other words, only two networks are possible: γ1 with 0 capacity on the
last segment and γ2 with 0 capacity on the ﬁrst segment. Capacity on each segment of each
network depends on the proﬁle of demands. In other words, γ1 and γ2 are functions of Q.
More precisely, γ1 : R6
+ → R4
+ is deﬁned by:
γ1 (Q)=( m a x{qbs,q bw}, max{qcs,q cw}, max{qas + qbs + qcs,q aw + qbw + qcw}, 0)
Indeed, the capacities on segments 1 and 2 must be suﬃcient to carry the largest quantities
required by B and C respectively over the two periods. Moreover, the capacity on segment 3
must be suﬃcient to carry the largest of the total quantity required by the three cities over
the two periods. γ2 : R6
+ → R4
+ is deﬁned in a similar way.
γ2 (Q)=( 0 , max{qcs,q cw}, max{qas + qcs,q aw + qcw}, max{qbs,q bw})
Suppose that the cost of building a network γ is given by a function c : R4
+ → R+. Then,
C would be given by:
C (Q)=m i n{c(γ1 (Q)),c(γ2 (Q))}
Thus far, this problem ﬁts neither the framework considered by Koster et al. (1998), since
the goods (gas in A,B,o rC)a r es p e c i ﬁc to agents, neither the one of Sprumont (1998) since
there is a vector of speciﬁc goods for each agent. To make the problem still more diﬀerent,
suppose that each city requires that scaling up, if needed, be done in a proportional way but
that scaling down be done in a non proportional way. More precisely, in the latter case, the
largest demand should ﬁr s tb er e d u c e du n t i li tr e a c h e st h es i z eo ft h es m a l l e s td e m a n da n d
9then both demands should be reduced proportionally. The prescribed path is described by





(min{max{τys,y s},τy w},τ y w) if ys ≤ yw
(τys, min{max{τyw,y w},τy s}) if ys >y w
This function belongs to Hi. One can insure that it belongs to Hi(ci) by imposing that ci be
increasing, be it slightly, with respect to both yis and yiw.
4 The Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule
The original version of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been introduced by Shenker (1990)
and characterized by Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994) in the context where the individuals
request a single private good, i.e. k =1and C (Q)=c(
P
i qi). Before presenting an
extension of this rule to the general context considered here, we give the deﬁnition of the
Direct Serial Rule introduced by Sprumont (1998). This is simply the original serial rule
applied to a problem (Q,C) ∈ Rn
+ × C(n) that is not necessarily homogeneous. This direct
rule will prove useful in assessing the properties of the Path Serial Rule.
Deﬁnition 1 (The Direct Serial Rule) Consider a problem (Q,C) ∈ Rn
+ × C(n) where




+,i=1 ,...,n,deﬁned by qi
j =m i n{qi,q j} ∀j ∈ N. The Direct Serial Rule
ξ
DS : Rn
+ × C(n) → Rn






C (Qj) − C (Qj−1)
n +1− j
,i=1 ,...,n.
In the context of Moulin and Shenker, C (Q1)=c(nq1),C (Q2)=c(q1 +( n − 1)q2),
C (Q3)=c(q1 + q2 +( n − 2)q3), and so on. Thus all agents share equally the cost c(nq1) of a
list of identical demands (q1,...,q 1). Then, agents 2,...,nshares equally c(q1 +( n − 1)q2)−
c(nq1), i.e. the cost increase when the demand is changed from (q1,...,q 1) to (q1,q 2,...,q 2),
and so on. Note that in this context, q1 ≤ ...≤ qn is equivalent to c1 (q1) ≤ c2 (q2) ≤ ...≤
cn (qn). This is not so for a more general problem (Q,C) ∈ Rn
+×C(n), since diﬀerent agents
may request diﬀerent commodities. Actually, the order between agents may depend on the
u n i t si nw h i c ht h e s ed e m a n d sa r ee x p r e s s e da n dt h u s ,t h ec o s ts h a r e sm a yd e p e n do nt h i s
choice. This is certainly something that we want to avoid. In addition, with heterogeneous
commodities, (q1,...,q 1) is not necessarily a vector of identical demands. Thus, there is no
10point in deﬁning intermediate demands in this way. Moreover, this would not work in the
general context where the number of commodities may be diﬀerent from one Mi to the other.
The Path Serial Rule that we now deﬁne takes care of these particularities. In essence,
it consists in ﬁrst ordering individual demands according to their stand alone costs. Next,
a ﬁrst intermediate demand is constructed by reducing demands of agents 2 to n along the
respective paths speciﬁed by the hi, down to the points where their stand alone costs are
the same as for agent 1. A second intermediate demand is constructed by reducing demands
of agents 3 to n, along the same paths, down to the point where their stand alone costs are
the same as for agent 2, etc. Finally, the formula of the Direct Serial Rule is applied to the
costs of these intermediate demands.
Deﬁn i t i o n2( T h eP a t hS e r i a lR u l e )Given a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+×C(m)×H(C),
suppose, without loss of generality, that agents are ranked according to their ci (qi):
c1 (q1) ≤ c2 (q2) ≤ ...≤ cn (qn).






j = qj if cj (qj) ≤ ci (qi)
qi





= ci (qi) if cj (qj) >c i (qi)
By deﬁnition of H(C), these intermediate demands are uniquely deﬁned. Finally, the cost






C (Qj) − C (Qj−1)
n +1− j
,i=1 ,...,n.
Remark 1 The Radial Serial Rule ξ
RS of Koster et al. (1998) is the Path Serial Rule ξ
PS
with the use of hR
i as the scaling function for any i and any pair (Q,C) ∈ Rm














the Axial Rule ξ
A of Sprumont (1998) when Mi = {i} ∀i and all three reduce to the original
serial rule in the context of the single private good. We say that they are Serial Extensions
of the original Serial Rule.
Remark 2 One might question the important role assigned to the stand alone costs in the
Path Serial Rule. From the point of view of agents, this may be the best criterion, at least
under increasing returns, since any subset of agents is then guaranteed not to pay more
on total than its stand alone cost. Yet, this is not the only way to order demands and to
11deﬁne equivalent demands. Koster et al. (1998) indicate that a more general binary relation
could be used to do so. In line with their formulation, ci could be replaced by any other
function, say gi, having similar properties. More precisely, let G =( g1,...,g n) be the vector
of such functions. Then, a problem would be deﬁned by a four-tuple (Q,C,H,G) where
each hi would now be requested to belong to the class of functions Hi (gi) ⊂ Hi for which
gi (hi (y, ·)) is continuous and increasing, with gi (hi (y,0)) = 0. The deﬁnition of the Path
Serial Rule would be modiﬁed accordingly. Examples of modiﬁcations of the Path Serial
Rule along this line are given in Section 6.
Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994) show that the Serial Rule, i.e. ξ
DS, has interesting
ethical and consistency properties in the context of the single private good. What can be
said of the Path Serial Rule ξ
PS? More generally, does there exist a serial extension that
possesses the same or similar interesting properties?
Before addressing this question, we associate with any problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+×C(m)×
H(C), a reduced problem of a particular interest in the following way. Let c
−1
hiy : R+ →
R
mi
+ ,i=1 ,...,n,be deﬁned by
c
−1
hiy (α)=hi (y,τ):ci (hi (y,τ)) = α (1)
and cH
Q : Rn


















+ × C(n) is a new cost
sharing problem, which is normalized in the following sense.
Deﬁnition 3 Ap r o b l e m(Q,C) ∈ Rn












+ × C(n) deﬁned by (1-2) is normalized. We call
it the normalized path reduction of (Q,C,H).
When Mi = {i} ∀i, the function c
−1








normalized problem of Sprumont (1998). We now state, without proof, a very important
lemma.
Lemma 1 The Path Serial Rule ξ








i.e. by applying the Direct Serial Rule to the normalized path reduction of the problem
(Q,C,H).
12The last lemma says that ξ
PS consists in applying ξ
DS t oap r o b l e mi nw h i c he a c h
demand is replaced by its stand alone cost as with ξ
A. H o w e v e r ,t h e r ei sm o r et oi tt h a nj u s t
a transformation of vectors of quantities into a scalar. The deﬁnition of the cost function
that applies to the reduced demands involves a projection of each demand onto a manifold
of dimension one, i.e. a path.
Not surprisingly, there is a cost associated with this reduction, even in the homogeneous
case. As we shall see, ξ
PS does not satisfy all of the properties that ξ
DS meets in the single
speciﬁc good context of Sprumont or the single private good context of Moulin-Shenker.
However, since ξ
PS is tantamount to applying the Axial Rule to the normalized path reduc-
tion of the problem, it satisﬁes a restriction of some of these properties to the paths along
which the rules operates.
5 Properties of the Path Serial Rule
This section is devoted to the presentation and discussion of three sets of properties. The
ﬁrst one includes a strong form of scale invariance called Ordinality, which is satisﬁed by the
Path Serial Rule. In the other two, one ﬁnds the Equal Treatment of Equivalent demands
and the Path Serial Principle, which together characterize the Path Serial Rule.
5.1 Ordinality
Almost everybody would agree with the requirement that ﬁnal cost shares should not de-
pend on the units in which demands are measured. In the literature on cost sharing and
game theory, one often ﬁnds a condition called Scale Invariance, which says that linear but
otherwise arbitrary and independent rescalings of the units should not aﬀect cost shares.
Sprumont (1998) argues that no rescaling of the units should aﬀe c tc o s ts h a r e s ,n o to n l y
linear ones, a requirement which he calls ordinality. We adopt the same point of view and
we transpose his deﬁnition to the general context of this paper. Since a problem is now
deﬁned as a triple, which include scaling functions hi deﬁning paths, we add the natural
requirement that the latter be transformed by the same function that is applied to the units
and the cost function to transform a problem into an equivalent one. We also add another
natural requirement: the same transformation must be used for the demands of two agents
if they enter symmetrically in the cost function. This is essential to preserve the symmetry
of the cost function, without which some complications may arise.
13Let F (m) be the class of separable, increasing and one-to-one correspondences f : Rm
+ →
Rm
+. More precisely, each f ∈ F (m) is a list of m increasing one-to-one correspondences fi  :
R+ → R+, =  i(1),...,  i(mi); i =1 ,...,n.Let f (Y )=( f1 (y1),...,f n (yn)) ∀Y ∈ Rm
+.
We deﬁne two problems (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) and (Q0,C0,H0) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×
H(C0) as ordinally equivalent if there exists a transformation f ∈ F (m) such that:
• ∀i,j ∈ N : fi = fj if C is symmetric in the components i and j,
• Q = f (Q0),
• ∀i,∈ N : hi (qi,R+)=fi (h0
i (q0




• C0 (Y )=C (f (Y )) ∀Y ∈ Rm
+.
Under this deﬁnition, the demand of each commodity by each agent may be transformed by
any increasing function. This function may be diﬀerent from one commodity to the other and
from one agent to the other, except when the cost function is symmetric for these two agents.
However, separability requires that the transformation of each unit be done independently
f r o mt h eo t h e r s . T h ep a t hh0
i (q0
i,R+) is also transformed into the path hi (qi,R+) and the
cost function C into C0 in parallel with the transformation of q0
i into qi.
Deﬁnition 4 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Ordinality (O) if for
any pair of ordinally equivalent problems (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ ×C(m)×H(C) and (Q0,C0,H0) ∈
Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C0),w eh a v eξ (Q,C,H)=ξ (Q0,C0,H0).
We now give an example of two ordinally equivalent problems. Consider a problem
(Q,C,H) ∈ R4
+ × C(4) ×H(C) with q1 =( 1 ,1),q 2 =( 1 ,4),
C (Y )=2 y11 + y12 + y21 + y22
and hi = hR
i for i =1 ,2.N e x t , l e t f1 : R2
+ → R2
+ be deﬁned by f1 (y1,y 2)=( y1,y 2) and
f2 : R2
+ → R2
+ by f2 (y1,y 2)=( y1,y2
2). We obtain an equivalent problem (Q0,C0,H0) ∈
R4




1 (q1)=( 1 ,1); q0
2 = f
−1
2 (q2)=( 1 ,2);
C
0 (Y )=C (f (Y )) = 2y11 + y12 + y21 + y
2
22
H0 must meet the condition hi (fi (q0
i),R+)=fi (h0
i (q0





i (hi (fi (q0





i (hi (fi (y),τ)) ∀τ ∈ R+,i=1 ,2
14Substituting the deﬁnitions of fi and hi in the preceding identity, we get h0










While h2 deﬁnes rays, this is not the case of h0
2.
Remark 3 If f is linear, then (O) reduces to the standard Scale Invariance. In particular,
f transforms rays into rays. The above example shows that this is not necessarily the case
with an arbitrary f ∈ F (m). Consequently, the Radial Serial Rule does not satisfy (O)
since this rule operates along rays. Put diﬀerently, the requirement that rays be transformed
into rays places some restriction on the class of admissible transformation functions. This
restriction led Koster et al. (1998) to deﬁne a weaker invariance condition that they name
Radial Ordinality.
More precisely, two problems (Q,C), (Q0,C0) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) are said to be ray-to-ray
equivalent if there exists a transformation f ∈ F (m) such that the prescriptions for ordinal
equivalence hold with the third one replaced by:















Then, Radial Ordinality (RO) requires that the cost shares be the same for two ray-to-ray
equivalent problems.
Interestingly, two ordinally equivalent problems have the same normalized path reduction.
Thus, a cost sharing rule deﬁned on the normalized path reduction of a problem, satisﬁes
(O).
Lemma 2 Given a pair of ordinally equivalent problems (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C)
and (Q0,C0,H0) ∈ Rm











The proof is given in subsection 8.1. Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 The Path Serial Rule ξ
PS satisﬁes (O).
5.2 Equal Treatment of Equivalents Demands
The two essential features of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule introduced by Moulin and Shenker
(1992) is the equal treatment of equal demands and the protection it oﬀers to agents with
small demands against larger ones. In the general context of this paper, demands are not
15necessarily comparable in terms of quantities. Sprumont (1998) and Koster et al. (1998)
address this problem and propose reinforcements of the properties just mentioned. In this
subsection, we review the deﬁnitions pertaining to the equal treatment of equivalent de-
mands. The protection against larger demands follows in the next subsection. We start with
a property called Fair Ranking or No-Domination, which implies equal treatment of equal
demands for homogeneous problems.
Deﬁnition 5 Ac o s ts h a r i n gr u l eξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Fair Ranking (FR) if
for any homogeneous problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rnk
+ ×C(nk)×H(C) and i,j ∈ N, the following
holds:
qi ≤ qj ⇒ ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξj (Q,C,H)
Deﬁnition 6 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Equal Treatment
of Equals (ETE) if for any homogeneous problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rnk
+ × C (nk) ×H(C) and
i,j ∈ N, the following holds:
qi = qj ⇒ ξi (Q,C,H)=ξj (Q,C,H)
Koster et al. (1998) introduce a stronger condition, based on the notion of equivalent
demands. A very natural criterion to order two individual demands is their stand alone
cost. Thus, qi and qj are equivalent if ci (qi)=cj (qj). This criterion yields the following
reinforcement of the above two properties.
Deﬁnition 7 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Fair Ranking with
respect to stand alone cost (FRV) if for all (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) and i,j ∈ N,
the following holds:
ci (qi) ≤ cj (qj) ⇒ ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξj (Q,C,H)
Deﬁnition 8 Ac o s ts h a r i n gr u l eξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Equal Treatment of
Equivalents demands (ETV) if for all (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) and i,j ∈ N, the
following holds:
ci (qi)=cj (qj) ⇒ ξi (Q,C,H)=ξj (Q,C,H)
Sprumont (1998) uses the property of Symmetry instead, which can also be extended
to the general context. Comparing the demands of two diﬀerent agents does not in general
make sense. It does make sense however if the two lists of commodities requested by the
two agents are suﬃciently similar. One circumstance in which the commodities requested
by agent i can be declared similar to those requested by agent j is when the cost function is
symmetric in the components i and j, i.e. C (Y )=C (Yij) ∀Y ∈ Rm
+.
16Deﬁnition 9 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ ×C(m)×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Symmetry (S) if for all
(Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) and i,j ∈ N such that C is symmetric in the components
i and j, the following holds:
qi = qj ⇒ ξi (Q,C,H)=ξj (Q,C,H)
Remark 4 (ETV) implies (S), which implies (ETE). The converse is not true in general.
(ETE) does not imply (S) since a cost function may be symmetric without being homoge-
neous. Only for homogeneous problems are (S) and (ETE) identical. (S) does not imply
(ETV) since we can have ci (qi)=ci (qj) without having qi = qj.
Remark 5 The fact that ξ
DS satisﬁes (FR) on the class of normalized problems implies
that ξ
PS satisﬁes (FRV). More generally, let a rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ be deﬁned
from a rule ξ
N : Rn
+ × C(n) → Rn





. Then, ξ satisﬁes (FRV)
if and only ξ
N satisﬁes (FR) on the class of normalized problems. As a corollary, ξ satisﬁes
(ETV) if and only if ξ
N satisﬁes (ETE) on the class of normalized problems.
5.3 The Serial Principle
This subsection is devoted to the independence of the contributions of agents with small
demands with respect to the size of larger demands. The original condition has been deﬁned
for the single private good case. We ﬁrst extend the deﬁnition to the general context.
However, this condition does not have much bite in this context since demands are not
necessarily comparable. Sprumont (1998) proposes a more powerful condition called the
Serial Principle. The latter being incompatible with Equal Treatment of Equals in the general
context, it must be weakened. We propose the Path Serial Principle. The subsection ends
with two related conditions called Rank Independence of Irrelevant Agents and Independence
of Null Agents.
Deﬁnition 10 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Independence of
Larger Demands (ILD) if for two cost sharing problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rnk
+ ×
C(nk) ×H(C) such that Mi = K ∀i and any i ∈ N such that q0
i = qi and
q
0
j = qj ∀j ∈ N\{i} : qj <q i
q
0




17In the general context, (ILD) has no real content since demands cannot be compared. In
the homogeneous case, things are better but the condition remains weak since the relation
≤ on Rk is not complete. To obviate this problem, Sprumont (1998) proposes that demands
be ordered according to the cost shares produced by the cost sharing rule itself. This yields
the Serial Principle, which requires that an agent’s cost share be unaﬀected by increases in
the demands of those who initially pay more than him.
Deﬁnition 11 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes the Serial Principle
(SP) if for two cost sharing problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C), and
any i ∈ N such that q0
i = qi and
q
0
j = qj ∀j ∈ N\{i} : ξj (Q,C,H) <ξ i (Q,C,H)
q
0




In the general context of this paper, (SP) is a very demanding condition. It is not
necessarily satisﬁed by a serial extension. Actually, as shown in the next section, it is
incompatible with (ETE), hence with (ETV), which is a basic property of the Path Serial
Rule. Since (ETE) is a hardly disputable equity condition, the only avenue left is to weaken
the Serial Principle (SP) into a less demanding condition. We consider a restriction of (SP)
to paths.
Deﬁnition 12 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes the Path Serial
Principle ( P S P )i fg i v e nt w oc o s ts h a r i n gp r o b l e m s(Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ ×C(m)×
H(C),a n yi ∈ N such that q0
i = qi and
q0











Remark 6 From Lemma 1 and the fact that ξ
DS satisﬁes (SP) in Rn
+ × C(n), we obtain
that ξ
PS satisﬁes (PSP). Actually, the fact that ξ
DS satisﬁes (ILD) on the class of normalized
problems in Rn
+ × C(n) yields the same conclusion.
We conclude this section by transposing to the general context, two properties introduced
by Sprumont (1998). The ﬁrst imposes on a cost sharing rule that the ranking of two agents’
cost shares depends on their demands alone. Thus, a change in an agent’s demand must
not aﬀect the interpersonal ranking of the other cost shares. The second says that an agent
18with a null stand alone cost can be entirely removed from any problem without altering the
outcome for the other agents. This implies of course that agents with null demands pay zero.
Both are satisﬁed by the Path Serial Rule.
Deﬁnition 13 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Rank Independence
of Irrelevant Agents (RIIA) if for two cost sharing problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈
Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) such that qi = q0
i and qj = q0
j for some i,j ∈ N, then:
ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξj (Q,C,H) ⇔ ξi (Q
0,C,H) ≤ ξj (Q
0,C,H)
Deﬁnition 14 Given a proﬁle Q ∈ Rm
+, let ξ
N\{i} be the restriction of ξ to the reduced proﬁle
Q−i =( q1,...,q i−1,q i+1,...,q n) and C−i and H−i be the restrictions of C and H respectively
to Q−i. A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ ×Hsatisﬁes Independence of Null
Agents (INA) if for any (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ ×C(m)×H(C) and any i ∈ N, the following holds:
ci (qi)=0⇒ ξ
N\{i}
j (Q−i,C −i,H −i)=ξj (Q,C,H) ∀j ∈ N\{i}
Remark 7 Note that the premise of the condition as deﬁned by Sprumont, reads qi =0 .
Thus, our condition is slightly stronger than his in the general context of this paper.
Remark 8 (INA) implies that ξi (Q,C,H)=0∀i : qi =0 , ap r o p e r t yc a l l e dno exploitation
by some authors. However (INA) says more. If an agent with a null stand alone cost is
removed from the problem, this must not change the contributions of the remaining agents.
This is a form of consistency. The Path Serial Principle implies the ﬁr s tp a r to f( I N A )b u t
not the latter. Also note that (INA) implies Free Lunch, which Moulin and Shenker (1994)
use to characterize the Serial Rule in the single private good context. It also implies another
condition called Dummy in cooperative game theory, which says that if an agent does not
aﬀect the cost of any coalition that she might join, then her cost share must be zero.
6 The Main Results
Not surprisingly, paralleling the characterization of the original Serial Rule, the Path Serial
Rule is the only cost sharing rule that satisﬁes Equal Treatment of Equivalents (ETV) and
the Path Serial Principle (PSP). To justify the weakening of (SP) into (PSP), we ﬁrst show
that (ETE) and (SP) are incompatible in the general context. This means that (S) and (SP)
are also incompatible. So are (ETV) and (SP), hence the use of (PSP) in the characterization
theorem. To conclude the section, we discuss other characterizations of the Axial and the
Radial Serial Rule given by Sprumont (1998) and Koster et al. (1998) respectively.
19Theorem 1 If mi ≥ 2 for at least one i, there does not exist a cost sharing rule that satisﬁes
(ETE) and (SP).
This result follows from the enlargement of the demand space alone. The proof is given
in subsection 8.2.
Theorem 2 ξ
PS i st h eo n l yc o s ts h a r i n gr u l et h a ts a t i s ﬁes (ETV) and (PSP).
It has been pointed out in Remarks 5 and 6 that ξ
PS satisﬁes (ETV) and (PSP). The
p r o o fo ft h ec o n v e r s ef o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁn i t i o no ft h er u l ea n dt h ea x i o m s .S i n c ei ti sn o w
standard, it is omitted.
Remark 9 Combining Remarks 5 and 6, we get the following characterization. If a rule
ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ is deﬁned from a rule ξ
N : Rn
+ × C(n) → Rn







N satisﬁes Independence of Larger Demands (ILD) and Equal Treat-
ment of Equals (ETE) on the class of normalized problems, then ξ = ξ
PS.
Are there other characterizations of the Path Serial Rule? Sprumont (1998) shows that
the Axial Rule ξ
A : Rn
+ × C(n) → Rn
+ is the only cost sharing rule that satisﬁes Ordinality
(O), (SP), Independence of Null Agents (INA), Rank Independence of Irrelevant Agents
(RIIA), and Symmetry (S) in the context where Mi = {i} ∀i. However, there is an implicit
assumption behind this result: stand alone cost is the proper basis for the comparison of
heterogeneous demands. This is an implication of choosing the normalized problem as the
proper form to which to apply a given rule. But, why choose the normalized form? We
show below that, by choosing to apply the Direct Serial Rule to a diﬀerent member of the
equivalence class of the problem, and there may be good reasons to do so, we get a diﬀerent
rule that satisﬁes all the conditions of Sprumont’s Theorem.
Koster et al. (1998) have a similar theorem, which asserts that the Radial Serial Rule ξ
RS
is the only cost sharing rule that satisﬁes the Radial Serial Principle (RSP), (INA), (RIIA),
(ETE), and Radial Ordinality (RO). Clearly, Koster et al. assume that the stand alone cost
of the demand of an agent is the proper aggregate of this demand. Thus, the Radial Serial
Rule is deﬁned by applying the Direct Serial Rule to the normalized reduced form of the
problem. Again, why choose the normalized reduced form? For a diﬀerent choice of the
reduction, we get a diﬀerent rule having the same properties.
To illustrate these points, we now present three rules along the lines that have just been
suggested. The ﬁrst is designed for the general context of this paper and is diﬀerent from
ξ
PS, and thus from ξ
RS and ξ
A, except for homogeneous problems. The second rule is
20deﬁned speciﬁcally for homogeneous problems and the third for general problems, including
homogeneous ones.
One can imagine the ﬁrst rule, which we call ξ
T1, in the following manner. Given a prob-
lem, the planner decides to apply multiplicative factors θi to the stand alone cost functions
before using them. In all fairness, if the cost function is symmetric in the components i and
j, she chooses θi = θj.
Given a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C), let θ =( θ1,...,θ n) ∈ Rn
++ be
such that θi = θj if cH
Q is symmetric in the components i and j. Then, let the functions
ˆ ci : R
mi
+ → R+,i=1 ,...,n, be deﬁned by ˆ ci (y)=θici (y). Finally, ξ
T1 is deﬁn e di nt h e
same manner as ξ
PS except that agents are ordered according to their ˆ ci (qi):
ˆ c1 (q1) ≤ ˆ c2 (q2) ≤ ...≤ ˆ cn (qn)
and the intermediate demands ˆ Q1,..., ˆ Qn, are constructed using the functions ˆ ci instead of
ci. Clearly, ξ
T1 is diﬀerent from ξ
PS whenever ∃i,j : θi 6= θj.






+×C(n) where ˆ c(Q)=( ˆ c1 (q1),...,ˆ cn (qn))
and ˆ cH











, but it is not normalized. The rule ξ
T1 is actually deﬁned








Theorem 3 The rule ξ
T1 : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ is a serial extension that satisﬁes (O),
(PSP), (INA), (RIIA), and (S).
Proof. ξ
T1 is a serial extension since θi = θj ∀i,j in the single private good case.
It satisﬁes (S) by construction and (O) since all ordinally equivalent problems have the










. Since removing an agent from the problem does not change θj for the others,
ξ
T1 inherits (INA) from ξ
DS as well as (RIIA) and (PSP). Recall that (PSP) is the restriction
of (SP) to the paths hi (y,R+).
Corollary 2 The Path Serial Rule ξ
PS satisﬁes (O), (PSP), (INA), (RIIA), and (S).
Proof. ξ
PS is ξ
T1 with θi =1∀i ∈ N.
Remark 11 ξ
T1 applies to the context of Sprumont (1998), where Mi = {i} ∀i. In this
context, ξ
T1 satisﬁes (SP) and it is diﬀerent from ξ
A.
21We now deﬁne a rule, which we call ξ
T2, for homogeneous problems. With this rule, the
planner wishes to penalize in some way an abusive use of good 1 relative to good 2. Given a
homogeneous problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rnk
+ × C(nk) ×H(C), she selects a function g ∈ F (k),
which presumably depends on the units in which demands are expressed, and she deﬁnes
N1 (Q)={i ∈ N : g1 (qi1) >g 2 (qi2)} and N2 (Q)=N\N1 (Q), with N1 (Q)=∅ if k =1 .
Moreover, this partition is invariant over the class of ordinally equivalent problems: for two
ordinally equivalent problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C0,H0) with qi = f (q0
i) ∀i and f ∈ F (k),
N1 (Q0)=N1 (Q). Put diﬀerently, if the formulation were to be changed for (Q0,C0,H0),
then the planner would replace g by g◦f.Then, let the functions ˆ ci : R
mi




γci (y) if i ∈ N1 (Q)
ci (y) if i ∈ N2 (Q)
where γ is any positive real number. Otherwise, ξ
T2 is deﬁned exactly as is ξ
T1.
Theorem 4 The rule ξ
T2 : Rnk
+ × C(nk) → Rn
+ is a serial extension that satisﬁes (O),
(PSP), (INA), (RIIA), and (ETE) on homogeneous problems.
Proof. ξ
T2 is a serial extension since N1 (Q)=∅ in the single private good case. It
satisﬁes (O) since the partition of N is preserved under an ordinal transformation and since







inherits (PSP), (INA), (RIIA), and (ETE) from ξ
DS.
Remark 12 Since rays are particular cases of path, ξ
T2 satisﬁe s( R O ) ,( R S P ) ,( I N A ) ,
(RIIA), and (ETE) on homogeneous problems, showing that the Radial Serial Rule is not
the only one to possess these properties.
The third rule, called ξ
T3, applies to general problems. Given a problem (Q,C,H) ∈
Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C), we now partition N into two subsets N1 (Q,C,H) and N2 (Q,C,H)
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n gr u l e :
N1 (Q,C,H)={i ∈ N : ci (hi (qi,R+)) = [0,∞)}
N2 (Q,C,H)=N \ N1 (Q,C)
Finally, we deﬁne the functions ˆ ci : R
mi
+ → R+,i=1 ,...,n,by
ˆ ci (y)=
(
γc(y) if i ∈ N1 (Q,C,H)
c(y) if i ∈ N2 (Q,C,H)
where γ is any positive real number. From now on, the new rule ξ
T3 is deﬁned exactly as ξ
T.
22Clearly, ξ
T3 satisﬁes (O), (PSP), (INA), (RIIA), and (S). That ξ
T3 is diﬀerent from
ξ
PS, and thus from ξ
RS and ξ




,w h e r eQ = ((3,3),(0,2)),H R =
¡
hR,h R¢
, and C (Q)=c(q1 + q2)
with c(y)=y1 + a(1 − b−y2) and where a and b are ﬁnite numbers satisfying a>0 and









=[ 0 ,a), from which N1
¡
Q,C,HR¢





We have shown that serial cost sharing can be extended to the general context where agents
request several commodities that can be public, private, or speciﬁct os o m eo ft h e ma n d
where aggregation may be very general. Actually, aggregation may be so general as to
involve optimization. We have deﬁned the Path Serial Rule to meet this kind of problem.
As it names implies, it consists in scaling down the demands along paths that belong to
the speciﬁcation of the problem, in order to construct the intermediate demands that are at
the root of serial cost sharing. Put diﬀerently, the Path Serial Rule consists in applying the
original Serial Cost Sharing Rule to a projection of each demand onto the speciﬁed path.
We have been able to characterize the Path Serial Rule only by the Equal Treatment
of Equivalents (demands) and the Path Serial Principle. Yet, the Path Serial Principle is
considerably weaker than the corresponding p r o p e r t yi nt h es i n g l eg o o dc o n t e x t . I n d e e d ,
this principle says something about how cost shares should behave when demands change
along the speciﬁed paths. Anything can happen for other types of changes in the demands.
T h eP a t hS e r i a lR u l es a t i s ﬁes other properties such as Independence of Null Agents,
Rank Independence of Irrelevant Agents, and Ordinality. However, we have exhibited other
rules that have the same properties. We have also pointed out that the characterizations
of the Axial Serial Rule by Sprumont (1998) and of the Radial Serial Rule by Koster et
al. (1998), in terms of similar properties, rely on the implicit assumption that stand alone
costs are the proper numbers to compare heterogeneous demands, or the proper aggregates
of multi-commodity demands.
In a companion paper (Téjédo and Truchon, 2002), we address two additional issues:
monotonicity and bounds of cost shares. Moulin and Shenker (1994) prove that, under
appropriate assumptions on the cost function, the original Serial Rule produces cost shares
that are monotone with respect to own and others’ demands and that lay between reasonable
bounds. Moulin (1996) shows that it satisﬁes the Stand Alone Test under increasing returns,
i.e. no subset of agents pay more than their stand alone cost. We transpose these results
to the Path Serial Rule under an assumption of diminishing incremental cost. However,
Monotonicity and Cross Monotonicity is restricted to hold along paths.
238 Proofs
8.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Let f : Rm
+ → Rm
+ be the ordinal transformation. Thus, we have Q = f (Q0),h i (qi,R+)=
fi (h0 (q0
i,R+)) ∀i, and C0 (Y )=C (f (Y )) ∀Y ∈ Rm
+. The latter implies
c
0
i (y)=ci (fi (y)) ∀y ∈ R
mi






i)=ci (qi) ∀i ∈ N
In short, ˘ c0(Q0)=˘ c(Q). Next, we show that c0H0
Q0 = cH
Q. Given a x ∈ Rn
+ and a i ∈ N, let τ
and τ0 be two real numbers such that:













Since the two problems are ordinally equivalent, hi (qi,R+)=fi (h0
i (q0
i,R+)), i.e. hi (qi,τ)
and fi (h0
i (q0
i,τ0)) are both on the path hi (qi,R+).S i n c eci (hi (qi, ·)) is an increasing func-
tion, ci (hi (qi,τ)) = ci (fi (h0
i (q0
i,τ0))) implies hi (qi,τ)=fi (h0
i (q0
i,τ0)). Using the latter with
c
−1















































8.2 Proof of Theorem 1





+ × C(4) ×H(C)
where Q = ((2,1),(1,2)), ˜ Q = ((2,1),(2,3)) and C (Y )=( y11 + y21)
3 +( y12 + y22)
3 and
let ξ be a cost sharing rule that satisfying (ETE) and (SP). Suppose that ξ1 (Q,C,H) ≤





Next, consider the proﬁle of demands Q1 = ((2,1),(2,1)). By (ETE), we have ξ1 (Q1,C,H)=
C (Q1)
2











We have a contradiction between (3) and (4).
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